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I. INTRODUCTION 
For the last several years the issue of corporate governance (= the 
problem of the design of performing decision structures at the top of 
firms) has been heavily debated in Belgium and in most other Euro- 
pean countries. Everywliere, these discussions focus on the question 
whether or not the countiy's current governance model should be left 
or adjusted in favour of the US (Anglo-Saxon) approach to the sub- 
ject. Ever since the acquisition of the Generale Maatschappij by the 
French holding group Compagnie de Suez, the take over of large do- 
mestic firms by foreign companies has been a bone of contention in 
Belgium. Also the fact that few Belgian companies have been able to 
grow int0 large multinational firms has fuelled the discussion about 
the Belgian governance system. 
The current governance debate concerns the relatianships behveen 
share holders, board of directors and management in publicly quoted 
firms. At least at first sight, the structures that govern these relation- 
ships are remarkably similar between US and Belgian firms. In both 
countries the duties of the general meeting of share holders consist 
of yearly returning issues like approval of the annual accounts,as wel1 
as exceptional decisions like approval of adjustments in the corpo- 
rate charter. Next to the possibility to vote, share holders also have 
the right to receive dividends. In both countries the general meeting 
appoints the board of directors that in turn hires and fires manage- 
ment. 
X; Departement Toegepaste Economische wetenschappen, K.U.Leuven, Leuven. 
Notwithstanding preceding similarities, these structures actually 
seem to f~inction in a vely different way. Particularly, in the US share 
ownership in publicly quoted firms teilds to be relatively dispersed and 
management holds a very powerful position vis-à-vis the board of di- 
rectors. In particular, the board consists of both inside directors (= 
representatives of management) and outsiders (= have no link with 
the firm nor its management and usually do not represent large share 
holders) and its role is mainly confined to monitoring management. 
Mowever in practice management often exercises considerable influ- 
ence on the board. In terins of balaiices of power, the Belgian situa- 
tion is quite different. Ownersliip is concentrated and, next to reserv- 
ing some seats for the management team, usually the dominant own- 
ers distribute board seats ainong themselves according to ownership 
proportions. Directors that are independent of management and large 
owners play a minor role. As these latter equity holders doininate the 
board, they actually hire and fire the management and strongly influ- 
ence the firm's strategic choices. Although their influence has been 
shrinking over the last decade, a class of large owners that still plays 
an important role in corporate control are holding groups. However 
as large holding groups typically exercise control over several (many) 
firms, in a publicly quoted subsidiary conflicts of interest may easily 
arise between the parent and the smal1 share holders. For the former 
wishes to further the interests of the group as a whole while the latter 
prefer that the company in which they have invested thrives. This is 
very different from the US where holding firms virtually are non exis- 
tent. 
The main theme of this paper concerns a discussion of the Anglo- 
Saxon governance system in comparison wit11 Belgian governance from 
the perspective of transaction cost economics. In the wake of the pio- 
neering work of Williainson ((1984), (1985)) this approach has been 
very successful in illuminating many difficult governance problems and 
in pinpointing the role of important governance devices like the board 
of directors. It also allows for a clear analysis of the famous and com- 
peting share holder and stake holder models. This is very useful, es- 
pecially in Europe where countries are still struggling with moulding 
or remoulding corporate governance structures, and where the ad- 
vantages and disadvantages of both latter models continue to be a mat- 
ter of debate. Furthermore it wil1 be claimed that in the wake of the 
continuing integration of European stock markets (some) conver- 
gence of the Belgian system to more Anglo-Saxon governance habits 
will be unavoidable. Given this adjustment, the question then arises 
to what extend these changes in governance may affect financial mar- 
kets and hence the business of the (Belgian) financial firms. A sec- 
ond and related theine of the paper is the interaction between regu- 
lation and corporate governance in the financial sector. In particular, 
both regulation and governance are concerned with resolving prob- 
lems of conflicts of interest. Hence, the question whether the analysis 
of governance problems could lead to useful insights for regulation. 
It will be seen that when applied to specific regulatory issues it in- 
deed adds useful perspectives. 
Section I1 of the paper describes the development of the share hold- 
er and stake holder models. Section 111 respectively IV discuss the log- 
ic of the US (Anglo-Saxon) and Belgian (European) governance mod- 
els. Next, section V considers the reasons why the Anglo-Saxon mod- 
el is so influential in the European governance discussion. Section V1 
contains some remarks on the question whether or not corporate gov- 
ernance will transform the Belgian (European) financial sector. Sec- 
tion VII considers two specific regulatory issues and discusses addi- 
tional perspectives from the governance analysis. Finally section VIII 
offers some concluding remarks. 
II. GOVERNANCE MODEL§: THEORY 
Theoretica1 models of corporate goverilance are concerned with the 
design of efficient decision structures at the top of firms. These deci- 
sion structures comprise the relationships between share holders, 
managers and other important parties that are involved with the firm 
(employees, suppliers, customers), ... As the issue at hand essentially 
is an organisational problem, the first approach would be to set up 
wel1 balanced organisational structures. Such structures should pos- 
sess properties like separation of roles to create checks and balances, 
a clear set of rules of conduct, checks that these rules are obeyed and 
overall transparency. However applying these ideas is not so obvious 
in the case of corporate governance. In particular from an organisa- 
tional perspective there exists an important difference between the 
top of the firm and al1 hierarchical layers below. Specifically, al1 mem- 
bers in lower layers have a 'boss' who serves hislher own interests by 
keeping a check on hislher subordinates. This is not the case for the 
top level, and, as will be seenbelow, organising checks and balances 
with respect to this layer is very difficult. In fact this latter problem is 
the core issue of the governance discussions al1 over the world. As it 
wil turn out, no ready made solutions exist and that any choice has 
both advantages and disadvantages. Quite a iiumber of issues have to 
be tackled. For example, if there are many different share holders, as 
is typically the case in publicly quoted firms, important questions arise 
about how the relationship between the owners and the management 
sliould be organised. Should it be through a special body and if so what 
should be its tasks? And how should the relationship between em- 
ployees management and share holders be set up in the structure? Two 
different models, the share holder and the stake holder model pro- 
vide an answer to a number of important questions. In particular both 
models imply tliat there should be a body like the board of directors 
to organise the relationship between share holders and management. 
However they differ in the role that they assign to this board. Both 
models are discussed in section 1I.A. Unfortunately notwithstanding 
the illuminating insights they offer, these models leave important ques- 
tions unanswered. This issue is discussed in section 1I.B. 
A. Share holder versus stake holder model 
The share holder model starts from the problems share holders face 
once management and ownership are at least partially separated, as 
is the case in many large firms in practice. In particular, because of its 
involvement with daily operations, management acquires an informa- 
tional advantage relative to equity owners. This creates opportuni- 
ties for the former to choose corporate policies that best serves its own 
goals rather than policies that are best for the firm or the share hold- 
ersl. Contrary to what is often intuitively thought shares are not a 
strong but rather a weak type of security. This weakness is caused by 
the residual character of the cash flows of equity. In particular capita1 
is only repaid after all other claimants have received their due. Con- 
trary to debt, there is neither periodic review or maturity of the con- 
tract nor any fixed interest payment. Furthermore, once owners have 
handed over their capita1 input they are not needed anymore to keep 
the production process going. This is far less the case for other fac- 
tors of production like labour. However, just because of its flexible 
character, companies can hardly survive without equity. These spe- 
cial properties also make it hard to protect share capita1 from self in- 
terested actions of management by simple contracts. Hence a stron- 
ger instrument that matches the flexibility of share capital is needed. 
This instrument is the board of directors and according to the share 
holder model the protection of equity holders is the only reason and 
simultaneously the explanation for the observed existence of boards. 
Other factors of production are 'strenger' andlor have very specific 
problems and can therefore be protected sufficiently by other means 
like contracts (e.g. debt) or special purpose governance meclianisms 
(e.g. collective wage ~iegotiations, work councils, ...). That is, a board 
is a genera1 governance instrument and it is not cost efficient to use it 
where a special purpose governance teclinology would do. Such a loss 
of efficiency can be easily illustrated by the following case. Imagine 
for a moment that next to its share holders, some firm would also have 
debt holders, labour, .... represented on its board. It is not hard to imag- 
ine how in such a situation decision making could easily be hampered 
by continuous negotiations between different parties on the board. On 
top, ultimate choices would be determined by the at times haphazard 
way in which majorities are attached through the formation of spe- 
cific coalitions. In fact it is wel1 known from the literature on voting 
that if preferences across classes of voters are different, even the or- 
der in which problems are placed on the agenda may strongly affect 
decision making. Hence, according to the share holder model, next 
to representatives of the management team who are needed for the 
information flow, one should find only representatives of the equity 
owners. 
Stake holder and share holder model only differ on the issue of 
board representation. In particular, the stake holder model posits that 
next to share holders also other parties make residual firm specific 
investments. In fact any one who has made such type of an input is a 
stake holder. Often cited examples are the effort spent on building 
up company specific human capital or the investment sunk in a pro- 
duction process tailored to the need of an important industrial client. 
Likewise equity such an input is also residual in nature. Hence board 
representation is the appropriate instrument to protect it. The pro- 
ponents of this model do not offer a solution to the earlier described 
negotiation problems. Obviously these difficulties burden the practi- 
cal application of this view. Another element that hampers the use of 
this model is confidentiality. In particular, some decisions like stra- 
tegic choices require confidentiality for success. However, it is clear 
that board members may serve the class they represent best by not 
keeping to secrecy. For example, it is easy to imagine that such a prob- 
lem may occur for labour representatives during merger talks where 
plans involve a downsizing of the number of employees. Hence if a 
governance model is to function in practice, either it should keep close 
enough to the share holder model or the firm should be in a specific 
situation where it can circumvent the problems associated with the 
stake holder view. 
B. Theoretica1 governance rnodels offer an incomplete solution 
It is clear that the logic of the preceding models does not offer a com- 
plete solution to the governance problem. For, who assures that the 
board of directors will actually take up its tasks as it should? Experi- 
ence shows that it is not enough to prescribe by law that the directors 
should diligently perform their duties. To guarantee board perfor- 
mance one could think of creating some supervisory body that super- 
vises the board. However in turn, who will guarantee that this moni- 
tor of the board will fulfil its duties? This problem of who monitors 
the monitor is hard to solve. The US governance model discussed be- 
low addresses the issue by creating a system of checks and balances 
(or countervailing forces). In particular, if one can find a party that 
serves its own self interest by actively keeping the board and hence 
also the management on its toes, market forces will take care of the 
monitoring-of-the-monitor-problem. In the pre-1990 governance mod- 
el of the US, this was the threat of a take-over. In the post-1990 pe- 
riod the countervailing force is share holder activisin. Logic and the 
US experience indicate that the success of a governance model heavi- 
ly depends on the quality of the pressure and monitoring exercised by 
this countervailing force. The current critique on the quality of the 
Belgian governance system (discussed below) can also be regarded as 
an illustration of the preceding stateinent. In particular, in Belgium 
the role of countervailing force has traditionally been played by large 
dominating share holders. The main issue in the current governance 
debate is not that these owners have exercised insufficient pressure 
but rather that they have exercised too much of it. Specificaly, as in- 
dicated in the introduction, because control benefits are only reaped 
by the large owners, the interests of large and smal1 share holders need 
not coincide. The in the press heavily discussed case of the Belgian 
electricity provider Tractebel that is controlled by its French compet- 
itor Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux clearly illustrates the problem at hand. 
Hence the in Belgium still ongoing quest for a countervailing force to 
keep the large owners in check in publicly quoted firms. In short, the 
preceding discussion shows that because corporate governance is con- 
cerned with the top layer in the hierarchy of a firm a solution has to 
be found for the absence of a 'boss'. What is needed is a force that 
actively 'monitors the monitor'. 
111. GOVERNANCE MODELS IN PRACTICE: THE US 
(ANGLO-SAXON) CASE2 
The main task of US boards is monitoring management in the inter- 
ests of equity owners. This objective translates itself into the pursuit 
of the creation of value for the owners. Hence in this environment the 
fast rising popularity of a system like Economic Value Added (EVA) 
that aims at maximising share holder value, should not come as a sur- 
prise. The interests of other parties like workers, debt holders, cus- 
tomers ... come into the picture mainly as constraints on managerial 
decision making. In the US the view that share capita1 is vulnerable 
and should be protected is part of a long standing tradition. In con- 
trast to Europe, where over the past century substantial efforts have 
been devoted to the protection of labour, in the US considerable at- 
tention has been paid to the protection of smal1 share holders. As ex- 
plained in the introduction, US boards typically consist of inside di- 
rectors - members of management - and outsiders - directors inde- 
pendent of management and usually also of share holders. The fact 
that outside directors often do not represent large share holders is ob- 
viously a consequence of the dispersed ownership structure of many 
publicly quoted firms. In practice this ownership structure has prov- 
en to entail important disadvantages. In particular, at least until the 
recent past, due to the free rider problem of dispersed ownership, it 
was not unusual that management had attracted sufficient clout to de- 
termined board membership? OObously under such circumstances 
one would not expect much board independence and strong monitor- 
ing. Nevertheless this latter type of activity is important. For one has 
observed in the US that in the absence of sufficient monitoring man- 
agement slack grows as wel1 as the tendency of firms to over invest in 
often wasteful projects. The by now classica1 example illustrating this 
phenomenon is the growth of the US conglomerates during the six- 
ties. Also the royal compensation packages that management receives 
- sometimes resulting in yearly incomes of over $ 100 million US - is 
likely associated with management clout. However as discussed be- 
low the last several years the US corporate governance scene has wit- 
nessed important changes. 
A. US governnlzce closely adheres to the logic of organisational theoly 
Traditionally US governance is based on three principles that rein- 
force each other: transparency, checks and balances and the radical 
treatment of conflicts of interest. In fact in inany respects the US gov- 
ernance system applies the textbook principles of organisational the- 
ory. For prime elements of a sound organisational structure are trans- 
parency, clear separation of functions and ditto behavioural rules, this 
in order to create checks and balances. Also structures that foster in- 
fighting and hence conflicts of interest are avoided. Until the recent 
past the functioning of the checks and balances proved to be the sys- 
tem's main weakness. Not surprisingly, the main theme of the US gov- 
ernance debate of the late eighties and early nineties has focused on 
this problem. 
Element 1: transparency 
A first t001 that helps transparency is provision of information. Con- 
sistent with the earlier mentioned long time goal of smal1 share hold- 
er protection, at least to European norms, publicly quoted firms have 
to provide investors with detailed information since many years. There- 
by the equal treatment of al1 share holders has been a major concern 
to regulators. To illustrate the difference with the Belgian tradition it 
suffices to refer to the law prohibiting insider trading, enacted in Bel- 
gium in 1990 but inspired by long-standing regulation in the US. A 
second element that supports transparency is a clear set of profes- 
sional behavioural norms and separation of functions with respect to 
the different governance parties. In particular, in the US manage- 
ment's task is to enact and oversee daily operations as wel1 as design- 
ing corporate strategy. The board serves as 'first-line' monitor and de- 
cides about whether or not to approve management's strategy pro- 
posals. Finally the financial markets provide financing and engage in 
permanent 'second 1ine'-monitoring aimed at keeping both manage- 
ment and board on its toes. As disciissed below, in the pre-1990 area 
this 'second-line' monitoring proved to be mediocre which in turn 
caused 'first-line' monitoring to loose quality. Because of their key role 
since the early nineties much attention has been devoted to develop 
rules for the functioning of boards and to support the independence 
of independent directors. For example, currently it is considered good 
governance practice if the majority of the board consists of indepen- 
dent directors, chosen on the basis of clear professional criteria. It is 
equally considered good practice if, within the board, committees spe- 
cialising in key issues and dominated by independent directors are cre- 
ated. Exainples of key issues are auditing, remuneration of top exec- 
utives and hiring and firing of independent directors. Realists how- 
ever understand that preceding precautions help but still cannot guar- 
antee that the independent directors remain independent and func- 
tion as the monitor of the monitor. For why should an independent 
director spend effort on checking the propositions of management, 
especially as the latter is better informed anyway? Clearly the prob- 
lem of 'who-monitors-the-monitor' is hard to solve. Current US-gov- 
ernance practice has found a solution in strengthening checks and bal- 
ances by spurring share holder activism. 
Element 2: checks and balances 
In the US (Anglo-Saxon world), institutional investors as a group own 
an important fraction of the shares quoted on the national stock mar- 
ket(s). Their importance derives from the pension system that is based 
on the principle of capitalisation. Contrary to the model of reparti- 
tion (as is used in Belgium) whereby those currently working pay for 
those currently retired, the principle of capitalisation presumes that 
those currently working save for their own pensions. In this way un- 
der the latter system, in a wealthy economy vast reserves are formed 
that need to be invested. In the US system these reserves are concen- 
trated in the hands of pension funds managed by professional mon- 
ey-managers. Consequently, currently more than 50% of al1 publicly 
traded shares in the US are owned by institutional investors. 
Since the early nineties these latter owners are strongly stimulated 
to take up a more active role in questioning company management 
and boards. In fact as of the late eighties the US governance system 
has been steering away from hostile take-over bids (or the threat of 
it) as the countervailing force to keep managements and boards on 
their toes. During the eighties this method - which essentially involves 
a one shot activation of ownership (through the intermediation of the 
raider) - had come increasingly under attack. First of al1 this route of 
removing slack management is very costly as it typically involves pay- 
ment of substantial premia to the target share holders. Hence it is only 
usable for more extreme cases of under performance. Secondly, and 
even more dissatisfactory, in practice it turned out that those firms 
that needed disciplining most, usually were not the targets of the raid- 
ers (see e.g. Franks aiid Mayer (1992)). 
Since the late eighties US governance has gradually been adjust- 
ing to a new model whereby permanent activation of share owner- 
ship takes a more prominent role. In particular, over the last several 
years US courts have increasingly upheld corporate defences against 
raiders. Simultaneously institutional investors have been forced to take 
a more active owner ship role by obliging them to vote at the general 
meeting of the coinpanies in which they invest. This obligation has 
even been extended to investments abroad. However the role of ac- 
tive share holder does not imply that institutional investors should 
strive for exercising control over firms. In fact the latter is disallowed 
and institutional investors may not even accept board seats. This atti- 
tude of US regulators clearly reflects the textbook view of organisa- 
tional theory that the most appropriate way to create checks and bal- 
ances is through separation of roles. 
Over the last several years, institutional investors have indeed been 
more active in monitoring firms. In fact it should be easier to stimu- 
late activism wit11 institutional investors as compared to smal1 share 
holders. For one thing, professional money managers should be able 
to do a better job at monitoring than non-professionals-small-own- 
ers. Furthermore the earlier mentioned free rider problem can more 
easily be overcome as the ownership of institutional investors is large 
enough for value gains Erom activism to compensate for the monitor- 
ing costs. In practice many institutional investors have actually changed 
their behaviour. Instead of applying the traditional wal1 street rule (= 
sell if you do not like the management) they have moved towards tak- 
ing a more active stance. Some have even become renowed for their 
activism. For example, California Public Employees Retirement Sys- 
tem (CALPERS) and the California State Teachers Retirement Sys- 
tem (CALSTRS) are reputed pension funds that publish black lists of 
firms with lackluster performance. Often share prices already im- 
prove immediately upon publication as the stock market anticipates 
that, under the pressure of these funds' monitoring actions, positive 
changes wil1 take place within the firm. Notwithstanding al1 the me- 
dia attention, empirica1 evidence indicates only a limited long term 
direct impact of institutional activism however. In particular, the data 
show little evidence of improvement in long term mal-ket performance 
after the targeting, and if a change in the real activities of the firm is 
perceived, it is hard to establish the causal relationship between ac- 
tivisin and the change (see e.g. Gillan and Starks (1998)). 
Next to institutionals, also some share holders have become more 
active under the influence of bulldog-firms. The latter are specialised 
lawyer companies that search for opportunities to initiate a court case 
and then attempt to receive a mandate from share holders to sue man- 
agement andlor the board. Obviously, these bulldogs function as a 
mechanism that overcomes the free rider problem which is a plus. 
However one may expect its monitoring impact to be of lesser quality 
than that of institutionals. In fact, bulldogs may create a problem of 
their own because, typically these firms are paid only if a court case is 
won. Hence, these firms do not aim at separating out good from me- 
diocre corporate decision making. Rather they are interested in find- 
ing decisions that can be represented in such a way that a possibly win- 
ning court case can be constructed. The averse effects of this type of 
monitoring can be illustrated by the problems in the field of medica1 
treatment. In particular, it is not unusual in the US that doctors refuse 
to treat badly i11 patients because they anticipate to be sued if the treat- 
ment does not lead to a cure. 
Element 3: preventing conflicts of interest between share holders 
Eikewise the protection of smal1 owners, the reduction of conflicts of 
interest between share holders has been a long time goal in the US 
system. Already since the thirties, the legal and fiscal environment is 
hostile to the forination of large holding groups with publicly quoted 
subsidiaries. The tax treatment of complex holding structures is un- 
friendly, and also the antitrust regulation has hampered the forma- 
tion of complicated ownership structures that often are so importailt 
in European countries. Next to reducing potential conflicts of inter- 
est, strict rules have been laid down for the handling of remaining 
problems. For example, the fact that al1 relationships between a pub- 
licly quoted subsidiary and parent firm have to be at-arm's-length (i.e. 
be commensurate with market conditions) has a long standing tradi- 
tion in practice. By contrast, the at-arm's length-tradition in Europe 
is still evolving. Also, in the US, in order to obtain a quotation on the 
stock exchange, a company has to prove that in case conflicts of inter- 
est between share holders could occur, mechanisms are in place to 
control these problems. Certaiiily in the US governance system of to- 
day, avoidance of conflicts of interest is important because of the role 
of monitor of the monitor played by some classes of share holders. 
Clearly this monitoting activity may qi~ickly loose quality if it gets pol- 
luted by class-specific goals. 
B. No solution is perject 
As mentioned before, solving the problem of who monitors the mon- 
itor is extremely hard and it is unlikely that a perfect solution exists. 
Clearly the choice of the US is driven by the opportunities available 
in its financial mass markets of today. Notwithstanding its logic, the 
system nevertheless has inherent weaknesses. First of all, the risk of 
an overly powerful management continues to loom around the cor- 
ner. Secondly, asymmetries in information that are necessarily present 
in mass markets and the strong dependence on the quality of the judge- 
ment of outsiders may force decision makers to opt for wel1 accepted 
recipes even if a less traditional solution would be more appropriate. 
Therefore successful communication with the market has taken up a 
key role and firms have been adjusting to cope. To quote Ettorre (1996), 
'Fifteeii years ago, the C E 0  and C F 0  did not know major share hold- 
ers and really didn't care. CEO'S are now more accessible to money 
managers'. A third and closely related problem concerns the often 
heard complaint about the fact that adherence on the judgement of 
outsiders would force companies to realise profits in the short run. 
Especially the mandatory reporting of quarterly profits attracts much 
criticism. It goes without saying that this latter obligation forces man- 
agement to spend (too?) much effort on maintaining a smooth profit 
flow. Doubtless this wil1 sometimes also lead to situations where, at 
least from the perspective of their inside knowledge, management 
feels obliged to take sub-optima1 decisions. However the positive im- 
pact of the monitoring by active share holders should not be under 
rated: as discussed aboves, an active 'monitor of the monitor' is cru- 
cial in maintaining the quality of the governance system in publicly 
quoted firms. 
IV. GOVERNANCE MODELS IN PRACTICE: THE BELGIAN 
CASE 
As indicated in the introduction, the governance situation in Bel- 
gium as wel1 as in most other continental European countries is quite 
different from the one in the Anglo-Saxon world. The most striking 
difference probably is the concentration of ownership. Although also 
in the US publicly quoted companies may have large or even majority 
owners, overall the ownership is much more dispersed there. Not- 
withstanding the overall picture of stronger concentration of owner- 
ship, still important differences between European countries may ex- 
ist. In particular comparative evidence indicates that the percentage 
of publicly quoted firms controlled by a large share holder or syndi- 
cate of large equity holders is higher in Belgium than in its neighbour- 
ing countries (Wymeersch (1997)). Consequently, large share hold- 
ers typically dominate Belgian boards, and hence also the process of 
hiring and firing management. Furthermore, as they invest in follow- 
ing up the firm, these owners strengthen their influence even more 
relative to the passive smal1 owners. In this way - at least as compared 
to the US where overall there is a clear seperation of rules - in Bel- 
gian practice usually there is not such a clear distinction between the 
roles the different governance actors actually play. Bbviously the main 
advantage of this method of organising top decision making consists 
of the close attention large share holders pay to what happens in the 
company. Most importantly, although it is different froin the US (An- 
glo-Saxon) method, the Belgian way of activatiiig share ownership also 
offers a solution for the difficult problem of who 'monitors the mon- 
itor'. However this method of handling the latter issue also raises two 
important questions. First, are conflicts of interest between share hold- 
ers resolved (i.e. this is a question about the quality of the monitoring 
by the monitor of the monitor)? Second, is this type of governance 
optima1 for al1 firms at al1 times? 
A. Belgian governance and conflicts of interest 
Notwithstanding multiple attempts to resolve conflicts of interest be- 
tween classes of share holders, this problem still remains at the heart 
of the governance discussion in Belgium. An important step in tack- 
ling the issue was taken in 1995. Since then corporate law requires that 
any transaction between a parent and its publicly quoted subsidiary 
should be evaluated in a report drawn up by an expert and three di- 
rectors that are independent of both management and share holders 
(Ralet (1996)). Although such a measure is useful, still it cannot pre- 
vent many types of conflicts. A parent that consistently steers busi- 
ness opportunities to other firms of the group is only one possible ex- 
ample. Another one is the case where the company is forced to adjust 
its strategy to fit its self financing capacity. Furthermore, as discussed 
in section 2, without checks and balances it is difficult to keep the in- 
dependent directors independent. Whereas in the US independence 
with respect to management is the issue, in this case the problem con- 
cerns maintaining independence from the large share holders, espe- 
cially as these owners typically determine board seats. Recently sev- 
era1 organisations have come forward with propositions for improve- 
ment. The Commissie voor het Bank en Financiewezen suggests rules 
for more transparency. The commissions Cardon and Santens as wel1 
as the VBO focus on the board and propose rules that should lead to 
improvements in the quality of board functioning. A common fea- 
ture of the latter reports is that they contain rules aimed at making 
boards more autonoinous relative to large owners. For example, a typ- 
ical suggestion is that boards should have independent directors; als0 
the creation of specialised committees with an important role for the 
latter board members is suggested as good governance practice. Clear- 
ly these propositions are inspired by US-style governance, but cer- 
tainly do not go al1 the way. This is understandable. For the moment 
experience with a governance system in which independent directors 
play an important role is lacking. Furthermore as indicated earlier, 
the US (Anglo-Saxon) evidence shows that the most difficult prob- 
lem with this type of directors is to keep them independent. Without 
checks and balances it wil1 be difficult to avoid that over time they be- 
come dominated by the large owners. On the other hand, with the 
more radical solution that requires that independent directors fill the 
majority of board seats, the problem of dominance by management 
looms around the corner. Finally, even a wel1 functioning board still 
cannot resolve al1 conflicts of interest. For example, one could imag- 
ine that at the general meeting, for purposes of serving the interests 
of the group, a parent firm uses its voting power to block the propo- 
sitions from the board of a publicly quoted subsidiary. 
B. Is a uniform governance model good? 
A striking feature of current Belgian governance is the almost uni- 
form application of the governance model with dominating share hold- 
ers. As indicated above, concentrated ownership is the typical meth- 
od by which in continental European countries (certain classes of) 
share holders in publicly quoted firms are activated. Preceding dis- 
cussion certainly does not imply that this type of activation is inferior 
to tlie inarket based activation in the US. What is important is the mo- 
tivation underlying the choice for concentrated share holder ship. Op- 
portunities to derive important control benefits based on conflicts of 
interests between owners is a negative reason for concentrated own- 
ership; another negative reason is under developed capital markets. 
By contrast, a much better motive concerns reaping a sufficient re- 
turn on managing the firm wel1 (i.e. the case of the manager-owner) 
or reaping a return on the investment of monitoring management. In 
fact some firms prove to be better off with concentrated ownership. 
In particular, numerous US companies with weak growth potential but 
strong cash flow have realised dramatic improvements in profitabil- 
ity after share holders from the public at large were bought out and 
hence a more concentrated ownership structure was realised. How- 
ever after major operational restructuring has taken place, often these 
firms are taken public and may end up again with (relatively) dis- 
persed ownership. Furthermore although dispersed ownership is an 
important feature of US governance, large block holders are not un- 
known in the US. In fact Shleifer and Vishny (1986) mention that some 
30% of the Fortune top 500 companies have large owners. However 
it should be understood that in the US a block of 5 to 10% of the shares 
represents a very important ownership position. By contrast in Bel- 
gium, a block of this size is still considered to be relatively small, and 
unless a coaliiion can be formed with the dominating share holders, 
it may not yield influence over firm decision making. Preceding US- 
evidence contains a very important suggestion concerning ownership 
however. In particular, it indicates that it is highly unlikely that in a 
dynamic economy al1 publicly quoted firms are at al1 times best off 
with concentrated ownership. The observation that in a particular 
country al1 firms adhere to this type of owner ship structure should 
trigger questions about the underlying motives. Although the argu- 
ment of an undeveloped capital market may have had relevance in the 
past, it is becoming quickly less satisfactory as an explanation for the 
currently observed ownership structures in Belgium. Furthermore, and 
this contains a further negative indication for the Belgian situation, 
international evidence reported in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shle- 
ifer and Vishny (1997) indicates that the degree to which publicly quot- 
ed firins adhere to concentrated ownership is positively correlated with 
unresolved conflicts of interest. 
V. US (ANGLO-SAXON) GOVERNANCE IS A SUCCESSFUL 
EXPORT PRODUCT: A RATIONALE 
Although the Anglo-Saxon type of governance is dominant only in a 
small fraction of the financial markets of the world, i.e. in the Anglo- 
Saxon capita1 markets (other countries tend to base their governance 
system on concentrated ownership), this governance model has nev- 
ertheless been extremely influential in European governance discus- 
sions. In fact for several reasons one may expect that in the future its 
impact on Europe will continue to rise. In particular, within Euro- 
land, stock markets are quickly integrating so that a financial mass 
market is likely to emerge within the next few years. In this mass mar- 
ket institutional investors will be important actors and companies will 
have to adjust to these investors' demands. Thereby the latter typi- 
cally consider a firm's adherence to the Anglo-Saxon governance rules 
as a stamp of quality. As in financial mass markets quality labels are 
important4, and as Anglo-Saxon rules are suited to be used in mass 
markets and as on top no alternative quality label is available, one may 
expect increasing pressure on European countries to move closer to- 
wards the Anglo-Saxon model. 
Other developments are als0 likely to force Belgian (European) 
publicly quoted firms will have to pay more attention to the prefer- 
ences of the group of non dominant owners. In the future, in partic- 
ular, the lure of the historically high stock price levels lias led an in- 
creasing number of firms to undertake an initia1 public offering or a 
seasoned offering during the late nineties. In fact, until the recent past 
very few Belgian (continental European) firms ever considered the 
idea of getting a public quotation. Moreover once quoted, these com- 
panies rarely tapped the stock market for fresh equity capital. This 
together with a limited free float and hence small liquidity of the mar- 
ket in firms' shares, contributed to the fact that limited attention was 
paid to the stock market in corporate decision making. Obviously, 
when raising cash from the public market becomes more important, 
this necessarily implies that more attention has to be paid to the lat- 
ter. Another factor that causes a rise in companies tapping the finan- 
cial resources of the market are new growth opportunities. Whereas 
in the past most Belgian firms were able to adjust their growth plans 
to fit self financing, for an increasing number of companies this has 
become impossible. In particular, contrary to the more traditional 
businesses where the size of the market is often geographically lim- 
ited, the high-tech sector is concerned wit11 products whose natura1 
home market reaches far beyond the borders of the country where the 
firm is located. Furthermore developments in that area often imply 
that if a company is to prosper it needs to attain quickly a leading po- 
sition world wide or at least continent wide. Finally, in several busi- 
ness sectors, significant increases in scale through mergers and acqui- 
sitions are taking place. Again, the latter type of transactions requires 
additional financing. 
Next to the increased appetite for additional financing, also over- 
all changes in the environment are already today causing (some) com- 
panies to change their attitude towards the stock market. First and 
foremost, with the Euro, the home market for Belgian investors will 
continue to broaden to encompass Euroland. This implies that the tra- 
ditional home-bias (i.e. unvestors' preference for securities from the 
home country) wil1 weaken. One may expect that this tendency to in- 
ternationalise portfolios will be enhanced by the rising importance of 
institutional investors. In turn this will force firms to compete inter- 
nationally for investors' money. In fact the example of Sweden shows 
that the pressure of institutional investors may quickly force compa- 
nies to adjust their governance system to a more inarket orientedview. 
Even ownership structures have changed over a time span of a few 
years after Anglo-Saxon pension funds increased their investments in 
Swedish firms. In particular, Rydqvist and Odegaard (1997) report that 
the percentage of publicly quoted firms with more or less widely dis- 
persed ownership (i.e. no one owns more than 25% of the shares) in- 
creased from 5% to 24% in the period 1991-1996, and this primarily 
due to a different ownership structure of newly quoted firms. Simul- 
taneously the traditional premium for shares with multiple voting 
rights vis-à-vis those with single voting rights dwindled to almost zero. 
A second change in the environment that could deliver an important 
contribution to firms' preoccupation with the stock market is the in- 
creasing interest in and success of stock option plans (in Belgium and 
Europe). International competition for top talent places especially Eu- 
ropean liigh-tecli firms under an increasing pressure to match US (An- 
glo-Saxon) payment conditions. Whereas in the past the legal and fis- 
cal system has been hostile to it, since the mid nineties several Euro- 
pean countries (among which Belgium) have been adjusting rules in 
favour of this type of remuneration, whereas others are working on 
proposals in that direction. 
It is important to note that preceding discussion does not imply that 
concentrated ownership wil1 disappear in Belgium (Europe). For the 
problem of European governance is not that large ownership would 
be a bad thing. In fact, as previously indicated, large share holders inay 
be a plus for the governance system as they help to resolve the prob- 
lem of 'who monitors the monitor'. Rather the main issue in the Eu- 
ropean discussion concerns the fact that conflicts of interest have not 
been sufficiently addressed. And, as meiltioned in the previous sec- 
tion, also in the Anglo-Saxon world numerous prospering publicly 
quoted firms have a large block holder. 
VI. WILL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TRAWSFORM THE 
BELGIAN (EUROPEAN) FINANCIAL SECTOR? 
Notwithstanding the fact that European corporate governance is like- 
ly to undergo major adjustments in the next few years, one may not 
expect these changes to transform the Belgian (European) financial 
sector. Rather the evolution in governance is part of a major process 
of transformation of financial markets that is generally expected to 
deeply affect banking firms. 
Many articles have already been devoted to the impact of future 
trends on banking firms5. A discussion of these expected changes ob- 
viously falls outside the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless a few 
comments on corporate governance and the transformation of Euro- 
pean financial markets are in order here. As discussed in section V, 
future trends are likely to trigger important adjustments in corporate 
governance. However, conversely, the earlier mentioned evidence 
from La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also im- 
plies that a more market oriented governance model as the one of the 
US better supports a financial mass market in equity and bonds. Put 
differently, US-type governance would support desintermediation. For 
banks this obviously has a negative impact because lending business 
may be lost. Simultaneously however, desintermediation and a gov- 
ernance model that is more open to outsiders creates more invest- 
ment banking opportunities for financial intermediaries. Further- 
more if tlie more market oriented governance view spills over into the 
sector of non quoted firms, tlie venture capita1 subsidiaries of banks 
may also profit from a rise in activity. On tlie negative side, tradition- 
al saving products offered by banks will likely loose interest from the 
investing public. On the positive side however the changes in the fi- 
nancial markets will create opportunities for new products and more 
fee business from money-management. Overall at present it is still to 
early to make predictions about whether advantages will outweigh dis- 
advantages. Furthermore such a prediction exercise is hainpered by 
the fact that not only European banlcing models differ from country 
to country, but also that within countries the market position of in- 
termediaires and hence their likely reaction to changes in the envi- 
ronment may differ also. 
VII. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LOGIC AWD SPECIFIC 
REGULATION ISSUES: TWO BELGIAN EXAMPLES 
In the introduction the question was asked whether ideas from cor- 
porate governance could illuminate or at least offer additional per- 
spectives with respect to specific regulatory issues6. This section il- 
lustrates that, at least for the problem of bank ownership of share cap- 
ital in other firms, this is indeed the case. In particular, subsequent 
subsections V1I.A. en V1I.B. offer some comments on the issue of per- 
manent ownership of large blocks in publicly quoted firms and the is- 
sue of transitory ownership of shares in non quoted companies from 
the governance perspective. 
A. Large 'permanent" owner ship bloclzs in publicly quoted firms 
Ever since the abolishment of the mixed bank in Belgium in 1935 and 
the ensuing split of its business into the activity of commercial banks 
on the one hand and the business of holding firms on the other, at 
regular intervals tliere has been an upshot in the debate about wheth- 
er or not commercial banks should be allowed to take large perina- 
nent positions in the ownership of publicly quoted firms. Although 
over time the original ban on share ownership has been weakened to 
allow banks to permanently own equity in financial subsidiaries and 
take transitory ownership positions in the framework of investment 
banking activities, the genera1 principle still remains that commercial 
banking and the business of holding firms should be kept separate. In 
the past the usual arguments in favour of lifting the ban concerned 
diversification and provision of additional risk capital. In particular, 
time and again it was argued that publicly quoted Belgian firms had 
difficulty attracting investors to provide them with sufficient equity 
financing. Banks could help solving the problem by investing in shares 
and hence channel more savings towards equity capital. This argu- 
ment was often complemented with the reasoning that although shares 
are ris@ and hence equity investments could increase the risk profile 
of the bank, such an increase should not be over estimated. Specifi- 
cally, this type of activity would allow banks more diversification pos- 
sibilities and hence give them more opportunities to generate income 
from multiple sources. However today the ???  are likely to outweigh 
the ???. First there is the Longstanding argument rooted in the expe- 
rience from the economic crises of the thirties where losses on equity 
positions brought banks int0 difficulties. Furthermore, with the de- 
velopment of Belgian capital markets, and in view of the impending 
integration into a large Euro-market, at present as wel1 as in coming 
years, risk capita1 is (likely to be) sufficiently available. Finally the ar- 
gument~ from corporate governance given below indicate that in to- 
day's capita1 markets the disadvantages of banks as large block hold- 
ers probably outweigh the advantages. 
According to the academic literature, the main advantages of us- 
ing banks as large share holders-monitors are threefold. First there is 
the opportunity to reduce information asymmetries thereby benefit- 
ing both banks and borrowing companies. Second, some conflicts of 
interest may be mitigated when banks also become share holder. Third, 
large share holders are strong monitors. The hypothesis that infor- 
mation flows between banks and borrowing firms are favourably af- 
fected if a banker can simultaneously play the role of lender and share 
holder is based upon the observation that both lending and monitor- 
ing require inside information. Clearly if the banker-large share hold- 
er is also represented on the board, it has two channels to receive com- 
plementary information. This reduction in information asymmetries 
is hypothesised to result in many beneficia1 effects. For example, it is 
argued that because the banker is better informed, it may be less re- 
luctant to extend loans because it understands that the management 
lacks the necessary informational advantage to f001 the banker. Fur- 
thermore since the financial intermediary is both share holder and 
lender, the conflicts of interest between the providers of those two 
kinds of financing is reduced (see for example Miilbert (1998)). How- 
ever, when the firm is publicly quoted these advantages also imply con- 
flict~ of interest between tlie banker and the small share holders. For 
the intermediary's motives can be regarded as a portfolio of share 
holder and lender interests in which the weights of the different views 
vary according to the relative benefits of its ownership stake and lend- 
ing activities. In fact, the basic argumentation concerning the ratio- 
nale for a board from section 11 implies that bringing debt interests 
onto the board causes governance inefficiencies if taylor-made pro- 
tective mechanisms for debt are available. In particular to protect it- 
self against unanticipated swings in corporate policy tnat could im- 
pede its position, a debt holder can use protective covenants. Further- 
more the whole idea of having publicly quoted companies is that there 
is enough information available to allow share holders from the pub- 
lic to make an assessment of the firm's situation so that the stockprice 
reflects future opportunities in a reasonable way. One would expect 
that this information also suffices to make reasonable assessments 
about the quality of a loan. Hence the ultimate remaining advantage 
of the mixed banking model is the one of the strong monitoring by a 
large share holder. However from the previous discussion it is obvi- 
ous that banker-lenders are not the ideal large owners because of con- 
flict~ of interest. Furthermore because the business ties between in- 
t e r m e d i a ~  and firm are close, it is very difficult to avoid these prob- 
lems. As indicated earlier, the governance discussion in Belgium (and 
many other European countries) essentially centres on the impact of 
large share holders on the quality of firm governance. What can be 
learned from the US governance system of today is that avoidance of 
conflicts of interest is important once certain classes of share holders 
fulfil the role of monitor of the monitor. As discussed earlier, the qual- 
ity of the governance system heavily depends on the quality of mon- 
itoring exercised by the latter, and class specific goals may quickly 
undo beneficia1 effects. 
Finally, next to academic arguments, also more practica1 oriented 
reasons in favour of the mixed banking model have been offered. In 
particular it has sometimes been argued that the banker-share holder 
could provide firms with financial and fiscal know-how as wel1 as ac- 
cess to business networks. It is unlikely that these arguments have 
practical relevance though. For, although this may be true for small 
companies, it is doubtful that publicly quoted firms are insufficiently 
professionalised so as to be in need of permanent support in these 
areas. 
Mulbert (1998) discusses empirica1 evidence on Germany where 
share ownership of banks in publicly quoted firms is important and 
finds that the results are inconclusive about the benefits of bank block 
holders. In particular, some studies find that banks do a good job at 
monitoring industrial firms, while other research indicates that bank 
interference leads to no better or even inferior results. Especially for 
later periods, the majority of the studies find average or even inferior 
performance of banks as large block holders as compared to non bank 
large block holders. In particular Gorton and Schmid (1996) consid- 
ered two samples: one for 1974 and another one for 1985. For the first 
period, company performance was positively related to bank hold- 
ings, while for the second period no relationship was found. For a sam- 
ple comprising the period 1988-1992 Nibler (1995) confirms the re- 
sults from Gorton and Schmid's 1985 sample and reports that banks 
do not perform their monitoring task any better than other large share 
holders. Wenger and Kaserer (1998) find for the period 1974-1993 
even a negative relationship between block holding by German banks 
and company performance. Along the same lines Böhmer (1997) re- 
ports that in take-overs bidder share holders realise a smaller return 
if banks are important owners of the bidding firm. 
B. Transitoly financing of non  quoted firms by specialised subsidiaries 
(= captive venture firms) 
From the perspective of governance arguments, the case of banks tem- 
porarily owning blocks in non quoted firins is quite different. For the 
latter type of companies the earlier arguments about information 
asymmetries and effective support in terms of financial, fiscal, organ- 
isational know how and access to networks are much more likely to  
be of practica1 significante. Furthermore as these firms are non quot- 
ed, the problem of conflicts of interest with smal1 share holders does 
not exist. What remains however are possible conflicts of interest em- 
bedded in risk taking by the bank vis-à-vis its depositors and its other 
debt holders. Current regulation minimises such conflicts as banks are 
required to cover investments in shares in full by bank equity. F~ i r -  
thermore as regulation does not permit other equity positions than 
those in financial subsidiaries and transitoiy ownership in the frame- 
work of investment banking activities, Belgian banks are forced to con- 
centrate venture capita1 activity in specialised subsidiaries. This lat- 
ter policy adds to transparency and obviously is a plus from the per- 
spective of good governance. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This paper discusses the logic of the share holder and the stake hold- 
er model for corporate governance and the way these theoretica1 ideas 
are applied in the actual governance system of the US (Anglo-Saxon) 
and Belgium (Continental Europe). Several major conclusions fol- 
low. First, a good governance solution for publicly quoted firms re- 
quires that the problem of 'who monitors the monitor' is addressed. 
In turn this implies that to be successful, actual governance systems 
need the integrated use of several tools. Second, because of the im- 
portance of quality labels in financial mass markets, and the fact that 
so far Europe has not been able to build a consensus on a workable 
alternative, the US (Anglo-Saxon) view of governance is likely to gain 
influence in European stock markets. Finally, when corporate gover- 
nance arguments are applied to the problem of share ownership by 
banks within the Belgian context, it is seen that governance models 
add useful perspectives to this regulatory issu. 
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(1976). 
2. Sectio11 I11 and IV follow the discussion i11 Van Hulle (1999). 
3. The free rider problem refers to the situation in which 110 individual small share holder 
tindertakes costly inoiiitoring because thc gain this owner reaps o11 hisllier owncrsliip 
position is too small to ofí'set the costs. Furthermorc al1 share liolders participate i11 the 
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see Van Hulle (1999). 
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